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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to discuss the privacy and security concerns that have 
risen from the permissions model in the Android operating system, along with two 
shortcomings of the permissions’ model that have not been adequately addressed. 
Design/methodology/approach - The impact of the applications’ evolutionary 
increment of permission requests from both the user’s and the developer’s point of 
view, is studied, and finally, a series of remedies against the erosion of users’ 
privacy, is proposed. 
Findings - The results of this work indicate that, even though providing access to 
personal data of smartphone users is by definition neither problematic nor unlawful, 
today’s smartphone operating systems do not provide an adequate level of protection 
for the user’s personal data. However, there are several ideas that can significantly 
improve the situation and mitigate privacy concerns of users of smart devices. 
Research limitations/implications - The proposed approach was evaluated through 
an examination of the Android’s permission model, although issues arise in other 
operating systems. Our future intention is to conduct a user study to measure the 
user’s awareness and concepts surrounding privacy concerns in order to empirically 
investigate the above mentioned suggestions. 
Practical implications - The proposed suggestions in this paper, if adopted in 
practice, could significantly improve the situation and mitigate privacy concerns of 
users of smart devices. 
Social implications - The recommendations proposed in this paper would strongly 
enhance the control of users over their personal data andimprove their ability to 
distinguish legitimate apps from malware or grayware.  
  
Originality/value - We emphasize in two shortcomings of the permissions models of 
mobile operating systems which, in our view, have not been adequately addressed to 
date and propose an inherent way for apps and other entities of the mobile computing 
ecosystem to commit to responsible and transparent practices on mobile users’ 
privacy. 
Keywords 
Personal data, privacy concerns, smartphone data taxonomy, user awareness, security 
issues 
1. Motivation 
As smartphone usage and capabilities grow rapidly, more complex operating systems 
and applications are developed that can offer a wider range of services to the users. 
Apart from the traditional mobile phone functionalities such as voice calls and text 
messaging, smartphones offer a variety of capabilities such as GPS services, email 
services, video recording, web-browsing and third-party apps (throughout this 
document we will use the term “app” as an abbreviation for mobile applications). 
Large volumes of users’ personal data are generated and stored on the smartphones 
such as location traces, usage logs, contacts, photos, documents, calls and messages. 
Each data type serves a series of purposes ranging from the enrichment of the 
functionalities of the smartphone in order to improve the user experience, to the 
processing and storage of the data. Even when the smartphone is not actively being 
operated by the user, it produces personal information about the user such as location 
traces, date-time logs of smartphone activation or shutdown.  
These data are often collected from the operating system or the apps on various 
occasions and for a number of needs such as to support their functionality 
requirements, create detailed profiles of the users, or get insight for a user’s needs 
and behaviour. The user is asked and/or supposed to give her consent to these apps to 
access her personal data as dictated/required by the permissions model. Currently 
there is no general applicable policy model to effectively specify the terms, 
conditions and purposes for collection and processing of users’ personal data. 
However, this practice is to be assessed at its compliance with the law. With regard 
to the respective regulations of the European Union, personal data are protected and 
their processing is regulated by the Data Protection Directive 96/46/EC. Data 
characterized as communication/traffic data (usage logs, location, duration etc.) are 
additionally protected by (tele)communications secrecy and rules embedded in e-
privacy directive (Directive 2002/58/EC). 
However, despite the fact that legal frameworks exist in many countries that specify 
how the personal data are supposed to be handled, there seems to be a considerable 
lack of transparency regarding the way permission requests are made. Questioned is 
also the lawfulness of these requests as well as the respective collection of data. 
Moreover, we diagnose a tendency of users and developers to unsubscribe from 
security awareness related actions. Users’ fatigue of the consecutive acceptance of 
  
more and more permission requests has been dramatically increased, as depicted in 
(Felt et al., 2012), where the authors describe an approach of users’ attention, 
comprehension and behaviour as “warning fatigue” for gradually losing their privacy 
concerns. On the other hand, developers have to deal with the high complexity of the 
permissions model. In (Balebako et al., 2014) the authors conclude that developers 
lack awareness of privacy measures and make decisions in ad hoc manner. 
On the other hand, the users are gradually becoming privacy-conscious and a number 
of privacy-enhancing tools for mobile users are discussed or even offered on App 
markets. A representative tool is TaintDroid, which examines thoroughly the 
personal data flows by analysing the operations of the underlying app (Enck et al., 
2010). Another interesting work is (Sarma et al., 2012), where an approach to assess 
the risks of installing an app based on the category and the permission requests of the 
app is presented.  
Our motivation is to reflect upon the common practices by mobile platforms and App 
developers and to highlight the necessity for effective protection of the user’s 
personal data flows. More specifically, due to the diversity of the data sources and 
the value of personal information, we suggest a data taxonomy based on the actors 
that have or request access to the user’s personal data. 
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide a smartphone data 
taxonomy according to the entities that have or request access to user’s private data. 
Section 3 discusses the data protection requirements for data collection and 
processing. In Section 4 we address two main permissions’ shortcomings while in 
Section 5 we study the impact of the apps’ evolutionary increment of permission 
requests from both the user’s and the developer’s view. Finally, in Section 6 we 
critically reflect upon the ways that personal data have been manipulated and we 
provide suggestions to address the current state of privacy and security issues.  
2. Data taxonomy on smartphone devices 
Every smartphone consists of a multitude of components and structures that (when) 
combined provide a series of functionalities offered to the user. These components 
are hardware resources, network services, informational data and application services 
and constitute the assets of the smartphone. These assets can be classified in four 
distinct categories: i) Device, ii) Connectivity, iii) Applications and iv) Data 
(Theoharidou et al., 2012).  
The Device asset encompasses all the hardware components of the device. These are 
the physical device and its resources (processor, memory, storage, sensors, display, 
battery, camera etc.). 
The Connectivity asset refers to the technologies used in order to provide mobile 
network connectivity services. These are the i. GSM services (Global System for 
Mobile communications), ii. WPAN services (Wireless Personal Area Networks), iii. 
WLAN (Wireless Local Area Networks) and WMAN (Wireless Metropolitan Area 
  
Networks) services, iv. Cellular network services, and v. Near Field Communication 
(NFC) interface services. 
The Applications assets refer to all apps that are installed on the smartphone. These 
apps can be preinstalled by the manufacturer or the carrier or can be third party apps 
that have been installed by the user. 
The Data assets are all the information stored and used in a smartphone. This 
information can be contacts, financial data, calling history, location information, 
usage history, pictures etc. and can be categorized into personal, financial, business, 
health, authentication or connectivity data types. 
The data taxonomy according to their source is (Mylonas, 2008): 
§ Messaging data: data derived from the carrier’s messaging services (SMS, 
EMS and MMS) or instant and e-mail messages. This category includes 
messaging logs as the receiver, the sender, the time and date of delivery, 
attachments etc. 
§ Device data: all the data of the device and the operating system that are not 
related to third party apps (contacts, images, IMEI, Wi-Fi MAC address, 
device serial number etc.). 
§ (U)SIM card data: these data include specific information of the user to be 
uniquely identified by the telecommunication carrier, such as the IMSI 
(International Mobile Subscriber Identity), the MSIN (Mobile Subscriber 
Identification Number) and the ICCID (Integrated Circuit Card Id). The 
SIM card contains the mechanisms for the operating system work flow, user 
authentication, data encryption algorithm, and it’s file system resides in 
persistent memory and stores data as names and phone number entries, text 
messages, and network service settings. 
§ Application data: all the necessary data accessible by apps and necessary 
for their execution. These can be configuration files, logs or temporal data. 
§ Usage history data: all the log data relating to the usage of the smartphone. 
These can be the call logs, the browsing history logs, the network 
connection history logs and the event logs of the operating system. 
§ Sensor data: all the data relating to the sensors of the smartphone. These 
can be location data, temperature data, direction data, vibration data etc. 
The most significant sensors that exist in almost every smartphone are the 
camera, the microphone, the GPS, the compass and the accelerometer 
sensors. 
§ User Input data: these data are produced from the interaction of the user 
with the smartphone. For example, in this category we have the keystrokes, 
the button presses and the user gestures. As gestures we can characterize the 
  
drags, swipes, taps, double taps, touch-n-holds and shakes, that is all the 
interactions a user can make in order to complete a specific task. 
These data sources can handle many sorts of information, such as personal, business, 
authentication, financial, health and connectivity data. According to the category of 
the information the underlying data sources relate to, some can be more critical than 
others. For example, the apps can handle all types of data, including sensitive data, 
such as health information. 
 
Different parties can have access to different data on the smartphones. A list of 
entities that can or/and have access to user information on smartphones is presented 
below: 
§ Mobile device: can have access to the device data and the sensor data.  
§ Operating System: can have access to the messaging data, the device data, 
the application data, the usage history data, the sensors data, the user input 
data and some of the U(SIM) card data. 
§ Applications: the app’s functionalities define which data should be 
accessible by the app. According to the functionalities, a certain 
categorization applies. These types of applications can be: 
A. Games " can access sensor data and user input data. 
B. Content and media consumption apps (music, photo & video, sound 
recordings, books etc.) " can access device data, sensor data and 
user input data. 
C. Core functionality and utility (phone tools, mapping, navigation etc.) 
" can access sensor data. 
D. Social networking, communication & lifestyle (VoIP, micro 
blogging, instant messaging, social media, shopping, news, ad 
networks etc.) " can access messaging data, device data, some of the 
(U)SIM card data, usage history data, sensor data and user input data. 
E. Business and productivity apps (mobile banking, translation, office, 
calendar etc.) " can access usage history data and sensor data. 
Browsing apps combine C and E type functionalities. These hybrid 
functionalities can apply because even if most popular operating systems 
have a pre-installed web-browsing app, it is possible to install third party 
web-browsing apps. These functionalities allow access to browsing history 
data, GPS sensor data and application execution data. All apps have access 
to the application data related to their usage, such as logs and configuration 
files, but cannot access the application data of other apps. 
§ Mobile telecommunication carrier: service providers collect incoming and 
outgoing calls and text messages, location data and data concerning the Internet 
usage (the frequency the email is checked, the frequency and the duration of the 
  
internet access). They can have access to the messaging data, the (U)SIM card 
data, the usage history data and the sensor data. 
         Data Sources 
Entities 
 
Messag
ing 
Data 
Device 
Data 
(U)SIM 
Card 
Data 
Applica
tion 
Data 
Usage 
History 
Data 
Sensor 
Data 
User 
Input 
Data 
Mobile Device  P    P  
Operating System P P ~ P P P P 
Application Type: 
A. Games    *  P P 
B. Content & 
media 
consumption 
 P  *  P P 
C. Core 
functionality & 
utility 
   *  P  
D. Social 
networking & 
communication 
P P ~ * P P P 
E. Business & 
productivity    * P P  
Mobile T/C carrier P  P  P P  
Table 1: Smartphone data taxonomy based on the entities that can gain access 
(P  depicts access to the specified data, ~ depicts partial access, * depicts access 
only to the data related to their usage) 
3. Data protection requirements  
Obviously, smartphones are much more than communications tools; they combine 
features of a cell phone along with PC-like functionalities. Smartphones host a 
plethora of heterogeneous data generated from various hardware or software sources 
thus constituting a very rich set of personal information. As ubiquitous devices they 
merge or even interfere with a person’s everyday life and respective privacy. 
Tracking a smartphone user and using applications to gain information may 
implicate in both the informational privacy and the communication secrecy of her 
(Mylonas et al, 2013).  
App developers seem often unaware of their legal obligations. With regard to users 
living in the European Union, data collection and processing has to comply primarily 
with the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) as well as the e- privacy Directive 
(2002/58/EC), According to the provisions of the Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC), European data protection law applies also in case that an app developer 
or an app store is established outside the European territory if they make use of 
“equipment” situated on this territory.  
  
The Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) defines the fair and lawful access and 
treatment of personal data. App developers to the extent that they are collecting and 
processing users’ personal data are to be characterized as data controllers, i.e. the 
entity/person that defines the purpose and means of processing. In this capacity they 
are required to provide users (data subjects in the terminology of data protection law) 
with comprehensive and understandable information concerning their identity, the 
purpose of data collection as well as the (potential) recipients of data.  Furthermore 
there must be a legal basis for data collection as defined in the Data Protection 
Directive: in question are either the consent of the user-data subject, the performance 
of a contract or the collection for achieving a purpose of the legitimate interests 
pursued by the controller or by the third party. Irrespective of the legal ground app 
developers have to comply with the core principles of data protection: a) purpose 
limitation and prohibition of secondary, incompatible uses, b) proportionality 
(adequacy, relevance and strict proportionality in relation to the purposes for which 
they are collected and/or further processed) and c) time limited retention of data 
collected.  
Smartphone applications request access to users’ personal data in order to provide 
them services but also for advertising, analytics and other secondary purposes. Many 
apps often collect data, including sensitive data, biometrics, location data or 
browsing history (Urban et al, 2012). The most serious privacy concerns stem mainly 
from the lack of transparency and - respectively - awareness of the fact, the extent 
and the types of processing an app may undertake (Data Protection Working Party, 
2013).  
The situation is aggravated due to the disregard app developers show for the 
principles of specified purpose and proportionality. Data are collected and stored for 
a variety of unspecified, further purposes and often they aren’t adequate, relevant, 
and proportional in relation to app functionality. The multiplication of actors 
involved (app developers, app owners, operating systems manufacturers etc.), the 
rapidly growing use for market research and advertising, the respectively significant 
aggregation and wide distribution of personal data and the “lack of meaningful 
consent” (Data Protection Working Party, 2013) increase privacy risks. It is, indeed, 
highly doubtful if the actual permissions’ model complies with the consent 
requirements.  
4. Permissions’ shortcomings 
Popular operating systems for smart devices provide a large and heterogeneous list of 
permissions to handle the access of apps to the vast set of personal data. For example 
the Android operating system version 4.4 supports over 140 different app level 
permissions to control the access of apps to the resources of the smart device.  
However, the permissions handling framework of modern operating systems for 
smart devices is far from adequate with respect to the European legislation according 
to personal data, as there are noteworthy shortcomings in the way the current features 
are implemented. App developers have to comply also with the consent requirements 
laid down in the e-privacy directive (art. 5 par. 3 of Directive 2002/58/EC) if they 
  
offer services to users living in the European Economic Area (EEA), regardless of 
the location of the service provider. According to the law the use of electronic 
communications networks to store information or to gain access to information 
stored in the terminal equipment of a subscriber or user is only allowed on condition 
that the subscriber or user concerned is provided with clear and comprehensive 
information inter alia about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the right to 
refuse such processing by the data controller.  
Even if the law requires a free and informed consent of the user as legal ground for 
store information or gain access to information stored, information is often neither 
clear nor comprehensive. The Data Protection Working Party, consisted by 
representatives of European Data Protection Authorities underlines that small screen 
is not an excuse thereof. Moreover, consent is reduced to a “just click submit” 
(Giochetti, 2008) process as notice and consent scheme is actually an “all or nothing” 
permission (Egelman et. al, 2013) which leaves no room for users’ preferences and 
choices.  
We will focus on the Android operating system but similar issues arise in other 
operating systems such as iOS and Windows Mobile. We start with a brief 
description of representative known issues of the permissions model of Android and 
then focus on two particular shortcomings which in our view have not been 
adequately addressed to date. 
In Android, when an app is installed the user is prompted to approve the permissions 
that the app requests. The user has no option to “negotiate” or to form the access and 
use options. For example, if a “compass” app requests access to read the specific 
sensors but also the identity and the contacts of the user, the user cannot grant access 
only to the permissions that are related to the functionality of the app. 
Certain permissions would be much more effective if they could support a more fine-
grained access control. Jeon et al., (2012) evaluate a fine-grained approach for app 
permissions. For example, an app that needs to connect to a specific Internet address 
in order to provide certain functionality should be granted only the permission to 
access the particular address instead of the permission to access the whole Internet. 
In Wei et al., (2012), the permission evolution and usage in the Android ecosystem 
since its inception in 2008, is studied. A key finding is that the permission model of 
Android is becoming more complex and hard for users and even developers to 
understand. A further observation is that permissions are not becoming more fine-
grained and that, in general, the whole platform is not moving towards an approach 
that will enhance the confidentiality and privacy of the personal data from the user's 
point of view.  
A technical issue with a negative impact on the effectiveness of the security model is 
that certain permissions are grouped in a way that makes the fair agreement between 
users and apps hard, if not impossible, to achieve. Less sensitive data are grouped 
together with critical PII (Personal Identifying Information) fields. For example, an 
application that needs to know if the phone is currently in a call, must be granted the 
  
“read phone state” permission. However, the same permission provides access to 
sensitive PII information, like the IMEI of the device, the subscriber ID, the serial 
number of the SIM, etc. 
Even though the “read phone state” permission is one of the most critical from a 
privacy point of view, there is another technical issue related to this permission. For 
backwards compatibility reasons, any app that supports older versions of Android 
must request this permission because in early versions of Android this was granted 
by default to the apps. The app developers have no other option if they intend to 
support the early versions of Android.  
Thus, several applications are requesting the particular permission without actually 
needing any of the collected personal data; a practice that infringes a fundamental 
principle of the European (Data Protection) Law, namely the principle of 
proportionality which requires only the necessary, suitable and appropriate data to be 
collected and/or processed, considering the purpose to be achieved, namely the 
service to be provided. From the users’ point of view, it is not possible to distinguish 
if and how apps will make use of the data collected on the legal basis of this 
permission, which serves as a consent, and also to realize and assess if these data are 
necessary for make use of the application or if they serve advertising purposes for 
example. 
Another issue is that the permissions have become too complex. For example, in 
(Vidas et al., 2011) the authors address the complexity of the permissions framework 
and propose a utility to support developers in aligning their permission requests with 
the needs of their apps. 
Finally, we would like to emphasize two shortcomings of the permissions models of 
mobile operating systems which, in our view, have not been adequately addressed to 
date: 
1. The first shortcoming is the apparent failure of the permissions model of the 
Android ecosystem to sufficiently support the rights of the users with 
respect to the protection of their personal data. Smart mobile devices carry 
an enormous amount of (sensitive) personal data of their owners. In the 
current permissions framework of Android, the app simply requests 
permissions without specifying the purpose of accessing the personal data 
and terms of using these data. Consequently, fundamental rights of the 
users, like the right to be informed about the purpose of the access to their 
personal data are simply ignored by the mobile ecosystem and the current 
market practices.  
2. The second shortcoming is about whether the requesting app has the right to 
transmit the personal data outside of the smart device. Apparently, this 
permission is a qualitative characteristic of the terms and conditions 
discussed above (bullet 1), but, in our view, deserves to be discussed 
separately. An app requesting personal data on a smart device differs from 
web or client desktop applications in that the app is running on a platform 
  
owned by the user. More precisely, when an app requests access to personal 
data it should be clearly stated if this information will be used only within 
computations on the device or if this personal information can be 
transferred outside the device. For example, if an app requests information 
about the age and the gender of the user simply to adjust the user interface 
to the corresponding age class, then there is no reason for the app to 
transmit this information anywhere outside the smart device, and 
consequently, the privacy of the user is not seriously threatened. If, 
however, the app plans to transmit these personal data anywhere outside the 
smart device, then this fact should be clearly stated in the request. 
5. Untraining the user and the developer 
The progressive erosion of privacy caused by the increasing permission requests on 
each and every app update may have adverse effects on the user's attitude toward 
security. West (2008) enumerated a series of psychological attributes involved in 
security depriving actions and the lack of user motivation is one of the main traits a 
user may exhibit. As the user may be predisposed towards not performing security 
enhancing actions - such as software updates in this case - it is reasonable to expect 
that the privacy degenerative app updates will further fuel such lack of motivation or 
even provide the user with an alibi not to perform updates. As a consequence, the 
emerging norms of the app ecosystem to request more personal data than required 
(by/to fulfil the purpose of the app), may result in the convergence or even the 
degeneration of the behaviour of privacy aware users and those who unconsciously 
consent in making their personal data available to third parties. 
Not performing software updates is particularly problematic for smartphones that are 
part of a corporate network. According to the Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
trend where an employee prefers to use her personal devices (laptops or 
smartphones) in order to carry out work related tasks, the security risks of an 
organization may rise significantly. With BYOD the traditional network (firewalled) 
perimeter does not exist, as user devices can "freely" enter and leave the corporate 
network, bypassing the perimeter controls. This situation has triggered a significant 
amount of research on risk analysis, security policy requirements and security 
controls for managing BYOD insecurity. In addition, when the device is a 
smartphone and also an employee's property, the risk of introducing malware in the 
corporate environment is high, as the administrator will not have adequate control 
over the device. 
Therefore the software app provider's appetite to collect and exploit the users’ 
personal data may eventually reach and impact the organisation’s security, if the 
underlying smartphone user is the employee of the organization. Furthermore, the 
increased complexity of the permissions may also cause similar effects to the app 
developer.  
Furthermore, a developer herself may not fully understand the different permissions, 
or may not appreciate the need for requesting the minimum set of permissions - she 
may in fact prefer to “play it safe” by requesting more permissions in order to avoid 
  
time consuming troubleshooting and debugging in case of software failures due to 
restrictive policies. 
At this point we would like to note that providing access to personal data of 
smartphone users is by definition neither problematic nor unlawful.  On the contrary, 
the functionalities of many apps make it mandatory for them to access sensitive 
personal data of the users. Moreover, one has to take into consideration that even 
privacy-aware users appreciate the value apps provide and not rarely concede to the 
commodification of their data as a price to pay in return for free applications, as free 
applications often request more permissions than paid applications (Pearce et al, 
2012). However, any disclosure of personal data of smartphone users has to comply 
with the European etc. regulations for the protection of personal data and the applied 
practices of platform and App vendors must effectively protect the rights of the users 
with respect to if, why and how their personal data are used. 
6. Discussion and outlook 
It is highly worrisome that today’s smartphone operating systems do not provide an 
adequate level of protection for the user’s personal data and it is possible that they 
are consciously developed with vulnerabilities. As depicted in Table 1, sensor data 
are the most critical, because they can be read by any entity that has access to the 
smartphone device. Moreover, the entity that seems to be the most threatening is the 
operating system, which has access to all personal data and yet has security 
vulnerabilities.  
As discussed earlier, several interesting ideas such as fine grained permissions and a 
better grouping of the permissions have been proposed in the recent literature. If 
applied, such ideas can significantly improve the situation and mitigate privacy 
concerns of users of smart devices. In this perspective we make the following 
additional suggestions:  
§ The permissions framework of mobile platforms should be adapted to 
comply with the requirements of the data protection framework concerning 
transparency towards the user, informed consent, purpose limitation, clarity 
and proportionality with regard to the extent and the duration of data 
storage. For example, when an app requests the “read phone state” 
permission it should at least clearly state how it will use each of the affected 
data items, for how long, that it will be securely stored during this period 
and that it will be securely deleted afterward. 
§ For each data requested by an app (and, in general, any applications running 
on the user-side), it should be clearly stated if these data will be transmitted 
outside the smart device (the data item as it is or results obtained from this 
data item) or if they will only be used inside the smart device. If the item 
will be sent outside the smart device, then its transfer, storage and usage 
should comply with the requirements specified in the Data Protection legal 
framework. 
  
Both suggestions are technically feasible and would strongly enhance the control of 
users over their personal data without burdening the legitimate app providers. 
Moreover, such measures would improve the users' ability to distinguish legitimate 
apps from malware or grayware (apps that carry out questionable actions without 
sufficient user notification or approval (Sarma et al., 2012)). Even though there are 
some tools, such as TaintDroid mentioned earlier, that a skilled user can use to try to 
figure out the risks of using an app, there is no established way for apps and other 
entities of the mobile computing ecosystem to commit to responsible and transparent 
practices on mobile users’ privacy. Our proposal is an inherent way of supporting 
this functionality into the operating system, along with the obligation of the apps to 
state why and how the users’ personal data will be manipulated. 
Another suggestion for limiting the often disproportionally rich list of permissions 
set by the app vendor is to leverage market attitudes and consumer behaviour that 
will demonstrate susceptibility on unjustified and/or extensive permission requests or 
lack of transparency. More specifically, a reputation system based on the evolution 
of permissions during version updates that is made public could allow a user to make 
an informed decision on the privacy respecting attitude of an app vendor. As with 
most community networks, their value follows Metcalfe's Law and in order for this 
recommendation to have impact, it requires commitment and subscription from a 
significant number of end users. If processing of data is proven to be an additional 
revenue source, privacy preserving app services could function as a competition 
advantage for data protection loyal developers. 
Our future intention is to conduct a user study to measure the user’s awareness and 
concepts around privacy concerns in order to empirically investigate the above 
mentioned suggestions. 
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